Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a result of excessive regulatory centralization. With the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Emergency Response, Cleanup and Liability Act (CERCLA, aka "Superfund") Congress centralized environmental policy questions that are, in many respects, inherently local in nature. This produced a "mismatch" between those jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature of the environmental problems at issue. Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines. Due to the local nature of hazardous waste problems, state governments should be given the opportunity to assume leadership of hazardous waste regulation and cleanup. While the federal government has an important role to play in the regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role requires more targeted and specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a comprehensive cradle-to-grave regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program that impose federal standards on local communities. Through technical guidance federal agencies can inform local waste management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform federal standards that fit few jurisdictions well. With federal efforts confined to those areas in which the federal government possesses a comparative advantage, state governments will be freed to reassume leadership in hazardous waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and concerns. This, in turn, could foster greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste policy, and a more justifiable regulatory regime for hazardous waste.
INTRODUCTION
Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a result of excessive regulatory centralization. The federal government has assumed primary responsibility for hazardous waste policy, placing states in a secondary role, even though the environmental threats posed by hazardous waste are generally quite localized. Hazardous waste itself is not a form of pollution, but rather a "precursor to pollution." 1 It only becomes an environmental problem when mismanaged, and allowed to contaminate land or water. Properly managed, however, hazardous waste is not a particularly pressing environmental concern. And when improperly handled, hazardous waste tends to create fairly localized environmental concerns. Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines.
Unlike much air and water pollution, mismanagement of hazardous waste does not involve substantial interstate externalities of the sort that would typically justify the imposition of federal regulation.
State governments should be given the opportunity to assume leadership of hazardous waste regulation and cleanup. While the federal government has an important role to play in the regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role should be far more circumscribed and targeted than under existing law. A more decentralized regulatory regime could produce more transparent and forthright accounting of the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste management and cleanup, encourage the development of more targeted and location specific remedial measures, and foster a more effective hazardous waste policy for the future.
I. FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS
National attention only turned to the environmental problems associated with hazardous waste well after the process of environmental policy centralization had begun. 2 Prior to that point, federal efforts focused on the more visible problems of air and water pollution. 3 The gradual nationalization of waste policy occurred with relatively little consideration of the proper roles of the federal and state governments in safeguarding the nation's water and soil. enhance the role of the states" 10 -a choice that undermined political accountability for hazardous waste policy. 11 Both programs have been plagued with excessive rigidity, poor prioritization, and minimal consideration of ecological (let alone economic) trade-offs. 12 Under existing federal hazardous waste regulations, "society spends a disproportionate amount of resources addressing a relatively limited selection of the risks posed by toxic materials." 13 Existing federal hazardous waste regulations and cleanup requirements seem to be more a reaction to "popular fears" than a rational approach to "reducing actual risks." 14 While hazardous waste may have ranked high in public perceptions of environmental risks, subsequent EPA analyses concluded that the actual health risks posed by hazardous wastes have been "overrated."
15
Under RCRA, the EPA regulates the generation, management, and disposal of hazardous wastes. CERCLA, in contrast, governs the cleanup of sites subject to hazardous waste contamination. Together, the two statutes impose extensive federal requirements on firms with nearly any connection to the creation, ownership, or disposal of wastes deemed hazardous by the 10 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 239. 11 Id.
("This allowed citizens to continue to treat hazardous waste as a problem someone else was going to solve for them."). 12 See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) ("the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Sovietstyle planning of the economy to achieve environmental goals"); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (summarizing problems of overly centralized environmental regulation). 13 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1521 (1995).
14 Id. at 1519 ("Important aspects of Superfund and RCRA seem geared more to responding to these popular fears than reducing actual risks."). 15 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 297 (citing EPA assessments of relative risks posed by various environmental problems subject to EPA regulation); see also nor is it clear the contamination created significant health risks for local residents.
54
CERCLA was intended to facilitate the rapid cleanup of contaminated sites and create a liability scheme to ensure that those firms potentially responsible for site contamination would be held financially responsible. The principle was "shovels first, lawyers later." 55 The statute also created a trust fund, the "Superfund" of the statute's name, to be used to finance site cleanup where potentially responsible parties had yet to be identified or contribute to cleanup costs.
Although the cleanup and management of polluted properties would seem to be a local concern, CERCLA displaces state authority to a significantly greater extent than the major federal statutes governing air and water pollution. 56 Largely due to its expansive liability provisions, which impose strict, joint and several liability on potentially responsible parties for waste site cleanup, Superfund is possibly the EPA's "most controversial and most visible" program. Over 45,000 waste sites are listed in the EPA's Superfund inventory. 58 From among these sites, the EPA created a "National Priorities List" of sites eligible for federally funded cleanup. As of 2007, the EPA has listed over 1,500 sites on the NPL. 59 While the NPL theoretically represents those sites in most dire need of federal attention, there are reasons to suspect that the NPL may not consistently represent those sites of greatest environmental concern. 60 At this point, it is reasonable to conclude that "the major risks from hazardous waste sites have probably been addressed through emergency removal actions."
61
As originally implemented, the EPA defined "success" as completing cleanup of a site and deleting it from the NPL. A recent concern about Superfund was its potential to discourage the cleanup and redevelopment of industrial sites. If the clean up costs for abandoned urban industrial sites to prepare them for redevelopment were not enough in themselves, the potential for Superfund liability discouraged investors further. 76 The effect of Superfund on such "Brownfields"
prompted the passage of modest Superfund reforms in 2002. At the time these reforms were adopted, the EPA estimated there were over 500,000 brownfield sites in the United States that were "underutilized or ignored, posing health risks and impeding the revitalization of inner city neighborhoods, which were once important centers of industrial activity. 
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Superfund has not been a total waste. The one aspect of CERCLA universally recognized as a success is the emergency cleanup and removal provisions. Some even term these provisions "one of the great environmental achievements" of federal environmental policy.
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Over the past 27 years, the EPA has conducted approximately 9,000 removal actions at over 6,000 waste sites. 80 Removal actions address potential environmental contamination and health threats not necessarily addressed by the remedial program. 81 Contrary to some assumptions, removal actions continue to require significant outlays. The requirements of quick and efficient waste removal appear to justify continued federal involvement in this regard. Even those removal actions that are not "emergency" actions are typically "time-critical" actions.
82

II. DEVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY
A consequence of both RCRA and CERCLA is the excessive centralization of hazardous waste policy to the detriment of sound environmental policy. As an environmental concern, hazardous waste rarely presents the sort of risks that typically justify federal regulation. As noted above, the waste itself is not pollution but a "precursor to pollution. 587 (1996) (where the scope of a problem does not match the responsible institution's jurisdiction, "the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little or too much environmental protection will be provided."). 86 Weiland & O'Leary, supra note __, at 211.
The primary environmental concern in hazardous waste management is the potential for improper waste management and disposal to contaminate local drinking water supplies. 87 Yet it is difficult to identify an environmental concern (other than land-use) where the argument for federal intervention is weaker -and the argument for local or state control stronger -than drinking water. As a general matter, drinking water quality in one community has no effect upon drinking water in neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away. 88 Even where underground water pollution crosses state lines, this does not justify the adoption of federal standards for hazardous waste storage, management and disposal. Targeted interstate remedies would be preferable. 89 If state and local governments lack the capacity to monitor hazardous waste management practices and site cleanup, this could justify financial and technical support from the federal government, but not the sort of extensive regulatory programs that now exist.
The improper handling, treatment or disposal of hazardous waste will pose different levels of environmental risk in different places. Just as some wastes will be more prone to seeping into groundwater supplies, or more difficult to remediate, some areas will be more vulnerable to such contamination. A region in which liquid wastes migrate rapidly through underground water supplies may need more restrictive measures than a region in which the soil 87 This is not to minimize the potential occupational health risks that can result from the improper management and handling of hazardous materials. Rather, such risks are more properly thought of occupational health risks -the sort regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration -rather than by the EPA. 90 Sigman, Taxing, supra note __, at 16 ("Land disposal may cause less damage to the environment in more arid areas because there is less risk that contaminants seep into groundwater. It could be more costly in places with greater reliance on groundwater for drinking water, agriculture, and other uses."). 91 Id. at 18.
92 GERRARD, supra note __, at 53 (idea of "perfect" disposal site is a "mirage"). 93 Sigman, Taxing, supra note __, at 15-16. 94 Id. at 22. 95 Id. at 21. 96 Id.
If, as some economists believe, the use of such taxes is a more efficient way to address the potential risks of hazardous wastes than proscriptive regulations, 97 it is noteworthy that states have been more aggressive in this regard than the federal government, 98 and that those states that rely the most on groundwater have been the most aggressive.
The argument for local control of waste site cleanup is even greater than for hazardous waste management. Theoretically, poor waste management practices in one location could lead to contamination elsewhere (though the contamination is likely to remain regional). Once a specific site is contaminated, however, it becomes a local land-use and risk management concern. The cleanup, and potential redevelopment of an individual site is the quintessential local environmental concern traditionally left in the hands of state or local governments. Equally important, decisions about the present and future use of individual sites necessarily requires the consideration of inherently local knowledge about ecological conditions, economic needs, and subjective local desires.
As a practical matter, "the Superfund program itself cannot address the full universe of contaminated sites. The massive number of such sites-hundreds of thousands-exceeds any plausible reach of direct federal involvement." 99 Each site is different, requiring site-by-site management and remedy selection. 100 "Physical attributes of the sites, such as annual rainfall and proximity to surface water and groundwater" will "vary greatly" from site to site. 101 With the possible exception of (3), this is all local information, more readily accessible to state and local officials than federal regulators in Washington, D.C., or even environmental officials in regional EPA offices. Even the cost and effectiveness of specific remedies will depend, in part, upon local conditions, the knowledge and understanding of which state and local officials are more likely to have than their federal counterparts. Lack of knowledge of present conditions and potential and likely future land uses, for example, can lead to unrealistic risk assessment calculations and the adoption of cleanup measures substantially more (or less) stringent than necessary.
104
The fifth item in Cannon's list is particularly important. There is no objective, scientific way to determine how "clean" a contaminated waste site must be before it is considered "safe," 104 See, e.g., Rhoads & Shogren, supra note __, at 260-61 (describing how failure to account for local land uses at Idaho Pole Superfund site in Bozeman, Montana led to excessive remediation measures).
nor is there a single correct answer to how such sites should be managed. Risk preferences, like aesthetic preferences, are subjective, and will vary from place to place. "The state and local community typically have strong concerns about the environmental risks at a given site, but they also may have concerns about other issues," ranging from site maintenance costs, the impact of various cleanup plans on future site uses and local economic development, and local quality of life issues.
105 "The local community also stands to reap a substantial portion of the nonenvironmental benefits of clean up, including the benefits that flow from reuse of the site, and may also be in the best position to assess those benefits."
106
An empirical study of the effect of waste site cleanups on real estate values suggests "individuals place a small value" on a waste site's inclusion in the federal Superfund program.
107
As reported by the study's authors, "these findings suggest that the mean local benefits of a Superfund clean-up as measured through the housing market" are lower than the cost of the While it may be tempting to argue that states lack the "scientific, technical or legal sophistication" necessary to ensure the cleanup and remediation of complex contaminated sites, this concern is at least "partially offset by the geographic heterogeneity of contaminated sites, 110 Id. at 163. 119 Id. ("At the time, however, there was virtually no state or public prosecution of nuisance-causing activities."). 120 Id. at 72. 121 Id. at 125. 122 Id at 102.
1970, local efforts were more comprehensive, and waste management practices were informed (albeit not consistently controlled) by various national trade associations with substantial expertise. 123 Much of the hazardous waste pollution that attracted public attention in the 1960s
and 1970s was the result of "casual waste management practices" that often contradicted the best practices recommended by industry and standard-setting associations, 124 rather than a lack of knowledge about potential environmental risks. 125 Given the potential liability exposure from such acts, industrial bad actors may have been no more responsible under a modern regulatory regime.
There is room to debate when and whether states would have adopted more comprehensive hazardous waste regulations absent RCRA's impetus. With RCRA in place, however, most states use federal regulations as a "floor" for their own regulatory programs.
126
There is some evidence that states seek RCRA authorization in order to adopt more stringent regulatory requirements than those imposed by the federal government. 127 improved their institutional capacity substantially, and many have adopted innovative programs that go well beyond the efforts of the federal government."
129
While some environmental analysts express concern that allowing grater state flexibility could lead to a destructive "race-to-the-bottom," under which states adopt progressively lax, and suboptimal, environmental protections, the empirical evidence to date does not support such concerns. 130 In fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, any "race" among jurisdictions is "to the top," as states seem more likely to increase their environmental efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions' actions than to relax regulation. 131 A study of state groundwater protection found an upward pattern in state efforts to protect groundwater.
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Such data suggests a "race to the top" in the protection of such local resources, rather than a "race to the bottom."
States have become particularly aggressive in developing their own waste site cleanup programs, some of which appear to outperform the federal Superfund program. New Jersey's waste cleanup law, the Spill Compensation and Control Act, was adopted in 1976, contemporaneously with RCRA and several years before CERCLA. 133 At the time, New Jersey was one of the few states to take the problem of waste site cleanup seriously. to adopt more stringent controls on the management, treatment, and disposal of waste within its borders. Such measures can be adopted without imposing discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce. 
C. Interstate Spillovers
D. Emergency Cleanup
Even those who call for reforms to allow for greater state leadership, if not complete control, of hazardous waste site programs acknowledge that EPA removal actions have played a "critical role." 167 Although states and local governments traditionally play the role of "first responders" in case of natural disasters and other emergencies, it appears that the federal government retains a comparative advantage in the provision of specialized crisis management functions, such as the rapid, emergency removal or containment of newly discovered hazardous wastes that may pose an immediate risk to human health or the environment. Such actions have been the most cost-effective aspect of the Superfund program from the start. 168 Given the success of such efforts, there is a strong case for retaining federal responsibility for emergency cleanup and removal of hazardous materials, particularly if federal assistance can be deployed rapidly and efficiently to locations where quick removal actions are necessary.
IV. TRANSITION RULES
Reorienting the respective federal and state roles in hazardous waste management presents a challenging transition problem. One possible means of facilitating the transfer of authority from the federal to state government is to gradually phase out federal requirements over a defined schedule. States that wish to assume control of hazardous waste policy within a shorter time frame, and seek to be free of existing federal requirements within their jurisdiction, could also be provided with an opportunity to petition the federal government for early relief from federal rules.
Elsewhere this author has developed and described how an "ecological forbearance" mechanism could be used to provide states with greater flexibility and autonomy in environmental policy. 169 This mechanism would allow states to seek greater flexibility than is allowed for under existing environmental laws. Specifically, a state would have the right to file a petition asking the EPA to forbear enforcement of a given regulatory provision, so as to enable 168 DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 21 ("The major risks from hazardous waste sites have probably been addressed through emergency removal actions."). the state to adopt more cost-effective or environmentally useful measures. A forbearance petition would identify those rules from which a state was seeking relief and the rationale for the request. The petition would be reviewed by the EPA in a public notice-and-comment rulemaking so as to facilitate public dialogue on the request and encourage political accountability.
The ecological forbearance mechanism could be used to enhance flexibility generally, and could also be used to facilitate the rapid transfer of regulatory authority from the federal government to those states that are already in a position to take over hazardous waste policy concerns within their state. States could use the process to seek greater leeway for setting enforcement priorities, management and disposal requirements, or cleanup standards. In each case, states would be able to customize their rules to local conditions and innovate with experimental approaches to waste management.
Adopting a forbearance petition process for federal hazardous waste regulations would not radically alter the existing regulatory environment overnight, however. There is substantial inertia built into the policy-making process. This means that such changes would likely begin modestly, and grow over time, with states learning from each other's experiments and innovations. In this way, actual experience could inform the ultimate contours of federal and state action in the area of hazardous waste.
In the case of waste site cleanup, the federal government should refrain from adding any additional sites to the NPL. Furthermore, states should be given management authority over all sites within their borders. In the case of truly "orphan" sites, it may be necessary to retain a level of federal involvement. There are means of transferring such sites out of federal hands as well, however. For instance, the federal government could hold a "reverse auction" for such sites,
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CONCLUSION
Federal hazardous waste policy has become particularly wasteful and inefficient.
Although hazardous waste problems are among the most localized of environmental concerns, federal hazardous waste laws are among the most centralized of federal environmental laws. In order to foster greater jurisdictional matching, primary responsibility for the regulation and cleanup of hazardous wastes should be returned to state governments. The federal government has an important role to play in hazardous waste policy, but this role requires more targeted and specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a comprehensive cradle-to-grave regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program that impose federal standards on local communities. Through technical guidance federal agencies can inform local waste management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform federal standards that fit few jurisdictions well.
With federal efforts confined to those areas in which the federal government possesses a comparative advantage, state governments will be freed to reassume leadership in hazardous waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and concerns. This, in turn, could foster greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste policy, 170 See James V. DeLong, Privatizing Superfund: How to Clean Up Hazardous Waste, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS 247 (Dec. 18, 1995).
